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Abstract: Recently, the EU Council adopted a new labour migration policy instrument - the EU Blue 
Cards (BC) - for attracting the highly skilled workers to the EU. The present paper examines the 
potential impacts, which BC may cause on less developed sending countries (LDC). Our results 
suggest that the EU BC will reduce human capital in LDC. In addition, BC will also have a negative 
impact on knowledge capital. These findings suggest that without appropriate policy responses, BC 
makes developing country growth prospects rather bleak than blue. Therefore, we propose and analyse 
alternative migration policy instruments for LDC. We find that policies implemented on the demand 
side of the skilled labour market are the most efficient. In contrast, policies that address the supply 
side of the skilled labour market are the least efficient, though they might be less costly to implement. 
Keywords: Knowledge capital, human capital, high-skill migration, innovative capital, economic 
growth. 
JEL classification: F02, F22, J24, J61, O15. 
1The authors acknowledge helpful comments from Julda Kielyte and participants of the European Society for Population 
Economics (ESPE) conference in Seville. The authors are solely responsible for the content of the paper. The views 
expressed are purely those of the authors and may not in any circumstances be regarded as stating an official position of the 
European Commission. 
2European Commission - (DG Joint Research Centre), Catholic University of Leuven (LICOS), and Economics and 
Econometrics Research Institute (EERI). Correspondence Address: European Commission, DG JRC, B-1049 Brussels, 
Belgium. E-mail: d'artis.kancs@ec.europa.eu. 
3European Commission - (DG Joint Research Centre), Economics and Econometrics Research Institute (EERI), and Catholic 
University of Leuven (LICOS). E-mail: pavel.ciaian@ec.europa.eu. 1. Introduction 
Recently, the Council of the European Union adopted a directive aimed at facilitating conditions of 
entry and residence in the EU of highly skilled migrants for the purpose of highly qualified 
employment (European Commission 2009). The directive establishes more attractive conditions for 
highly skilled third-country workers to take up highly qualified employment in the member states of 
the Union, by creating a fast-track procedure for issuing a special residence and work permit called the 
"EU Blue Card" to highly skilled applicants. With the EU Blue Card (BC) scheme the European Union 
wants to attract the best-qualified labour from the developing world, which is increasingly important 
to overcome the labour shortages in the ageing European Union. 
The Blue Card has two sides, however, and has already provoked controversial political discussions 
since its adoption. On the one side, the skilled labour attracted to the EU will certainly boost European 
competitiveness and economic growth. The other side of the Card is that it might harm the less 
developed sending countries (LDC), as it will increase the brain drain from developing countries and 
make it even more difficult for LDC to improve their innovative capital which, according to recent 
growth theory findings, is one of the key drivers of the long-term economic growth. 
More precisely, the adopted BC is both a selective and discriminatory policy instrument. BC aims 
neither at 'opening doors' for all poor people from LDC, nor at attracting labour from LDC in general. 
Instead, only the most skilled workers will be eligible for BC. In addition, the EU Blue Card can be 
revoked, if its holder has lost his job and was unemployed for more than three months! This 
mechanism implies a double-selection. At a first stage, only the most skilled workers from the total 
workforce in LDC will be selected and recruited to the EU. Second, only the most talented and 
successful of all recruited migrants will be allowed to stay and work in EU.  
Second, BC is discriminatory because it targets especially young male workers from LDC. For 
example, those highly skilled workers which are under 30 would need to earn only twice the minimum 
wage to be entitled to the scheme (for the rest the requirements is at least three times the minimum 
wage in the country concerned plus health insurance). Moreover, EU receiving country governments 
could decide to waive the salary requirement altogether, if the potential migrant is young enough and 
skilled enough. Thus, accounting for the gender wage gap, for young males it will be considerably 
easier to obtain BC than for older workers and women. This implies that EU aims at diverting the net 
tax income flow from LDC to EU. 
Third, BC will distort international labour market price signals by reducing migration costs for highly 
skilled and, hence, increasing the net wage difference between EU and LDC. For example, fast-track 
procedure to obtain work and residence permits for highly skilled and single application procedure 
adopted by the European Council will lower the transaction costs for skilled migrants. In addition, BC 
holders will be treated favourably regarding tax benefits, social assistance, payment of pensions and 
access to public housing in the receiving countries. Hence, BC will 'open the doors' only to a small share of selected persons from LDC, the moral aspects 
of what are highly questionable from a developing policy's perspective. In view of these and related 
controversies, the adopted BC raises several questions for the less developed sending countries. For 
example, what kind and size of socio-economic impacts of skilled worker emigration can be expected 
in LDC? What will be the long-term impacts of BC on growth and development in LDC? 
The main objective of this study is to analyse the impacts of the recently adopted Blue Card scheme on 
the key drivers of economic growth in the less developed sending economies and, based on the gained 
insights, to propose appropriate policy instruments for dealing with the negative externalities caused 
by skilled worker emigration. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the underlying conceptual framework. Section 3 
proposes and analyses policy options for LDC in order to address the adverse impacts of skilled labour 
emigration. Section 4 concludes. 
2. Conceptual framework 
Innovative capital in general and human capital in particular takes a central role in most theories of 
economic growth and development. Both the augmented neo-classical growth models (Solow 1956; 
Mankiw, Romer and Weil 1992) and endogenous growth models (Lucas 1988; Romer 1990) stress the 
importance of innovative capital in economic development in one way or another. For reasons 
explained below, we rely on the Romer's (1990) model. 
2.1. Endogenous growth 
The endogenous growth model of Romer (1990) has three sectors: a technology producing sector, an 
intermediate goods producing sector where capital goods are produced, and a final output producing 
sector. The production function is given by 
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Where U L  is share of unskilled labour and   H L  is the share of human capital employed in the 
production sector, which depends on the overall stock of human capital  H H HT L L L    , with the 
latter denoting the share of human capital devoted to the accumulation of technology, I . The part of 
human capital that is not used for producing goods and services,  H L , is used for creating new 
technologies. The level of human capital,  H L , has thus a positive effect on the growth of technology, 
I , the level of which determines the number of differentiated intermediate goods, x .
The innovation sector operates according to a national innovation production function: 
2 1   	 K L I H               ( 2 )
where I   is a sustainable rate of innovation. According to equation (2), the sustainable rate of 
innovation,  I  , is an increasing function of the number of skilled workers,  H L , and the stock of 
knowledge available to these skilled workers, K . The two coefficients ( 1   and  2  ) measure the 
relative contribution of the two innovative inputs: human capital and knowledge capital. Parameter  1 determines whether the marginal product of an additional invention is increasing (the so-called 
'standing on shoulders' effect, Caballero and Jaffe 1993) or decreasing (the so-called 'fishing out' 
hypothesis) in the stock of human capital, and parameter  2   determines the returns to scale with 
respect to the stock of existing knowledge. Coefficient 	  is a productivity parameter, which captures 
all other factors affecting the creation of innovative capital but not captured by variables  H L  and K .
Romer's (1990) model is particularly attractive for our study for two reasons. First, the rate of 
technological change is endogenous because the share of the economy devoted to the innovation sector 
is a function of the skilled workforce (determining  H L ), and the allocation of resources to innovative 
activities depends on the R&D productivity. Second, the rate of technological change is endogenous 
because the productivity of innovation creation is sensitive to the stock of knowledge capital, K ,
created by past innovations. Although, there is neither a general agreement on the precise values of 
these parameters nor on the functional form linking innovations to economy-wide long-term 
productivity growth, there is a relatively broad agreement that these factors are, indeed, crucial in 
explaining the realised level of economy-wide innovation (Furman, Porter and Stern 2002). 
2.2. Determinants of growth: the innovative capital 
Applying a logarithmic transformation to equation (2) and rewriting the growth rate in form of stock 
changes we obtain innovation production for a closed economy: 
K L I H ln ln ln 2 1   	              ( 3 )
According to equation (3), the national innovative output, I , is an increasing function of the size of 
skilled workforce,  H L , and the stock of knowledge available to workers, K . Given that both 
innovative inputs ( H L  and K ) are accumulable, their endowment is determined endogenously in the 
model. The size of the human capital,  H L , is determined by skilled labour wage,  H w , and the size of 
knowledge capital, K , depends on national R&D. 
In open economies with international flows of knowledge and human capital, the national innovative 
capital depends not only on country's endowment with skilled workers and technology, but also on the 
net migration of skilled labour (Sjaastad 1962; Bhagwati and Rodriguez 1975) and international 
knowledge spillovers (Krugman 1979). Not accounting for skilled labour emigration would 
underestimate the return to education (human capital), whereas not accounting for international 
knowledge spillovers would underestimate the marginal revenue of national R&D expenditure 
(knowledge capital). Therefore, we introduce high-skill migration and international knowledge flows 
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According to equation (4), open economy S 's innovative output, 
S I , depends on the size of skilled 
workforce,
S
H L , net migration of skilled workers, 
m
H L , domestic knowledge production through R&D, S K , inward knowledge spillover, 
m K , and parameters of the model.
4 The relative contribution of the 
four components to national innovative supply, 
S I , depends on the equilibrium strategies of economic 
actors (Kancs and Ciaian 2007). 
2.3. Human capital 






S L L L    units of labour, which is shown on 
the horizontal axis in the left panel of Figure 1. Skilled labour, 
S
H L , is measured from the left to right, 
whereas unskilled labour, 
S
U L , from the right to the left. Curves 
S
H D  and 
S
U D  represent the demand 
for skilled and unskilled labour, respectively, and 
S
H S  is the supply of skilled labour in S .
According to equation (4), workers decide on two issues: education and migration.
5 First, we consider 
the education decision in autarky, where workers choose between offering unskilled labour versus 
investing in education and offering skilled labour. According to Averett and Burton (1996), the 
education decision is determined by a trade-off between skill premium (difference between skilled 
wage,
S
H w , and unskilled wage, 
S
U w ), the cost of education, 
S EC , and the stock of knowledge, 
S K .
Thus, in equation (5) we explicitly assume that education is costly for workers. These costs capture 
both direct costs of education, such as tuition fees, as well as indirect costs, such as worker 
opportunity costs and education effort (which is different across individuals). 
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Given that education is costly, workers invest in education only if education increases their net 
income.
6 Thus, net of education costs, workers must earn at least the unskilled labour wage, which in 
equilibrium is equal to 
 S
U w . The vertical difference between skilled labour supply, 
S
H S , and the 
equilibrium unskilled wage rate, 
 S
U w , represents the cost of acquiring education (Figure 1, left panel). 
Its slope is increasing because workers are not equally talented, they are heterogeneous in their ability 
to acquire education (Cameron and Heckman 1998). In line with Willis and Rosen (1979), the last 
skilled worker, who enters education at 
 S
H L , is just able to compensate the education costs, his skill 
premium is equal to zero. Assuming full employment, the rest of workers, 
* S
H
S L L  , stay unskilled. 
The equilibrium wage of unskilled workers without migration, 
 S
U w , is at the point where the demand 
for unskilled labour, 
S
U D , intersects the vertical line at 
 S
H L . The equilibrium stock of skilled labour is 
 S
H L  and skilled labour wage rate is 
 S
H w . In equilibrium the education cost of the marginal worker, 
who enters education, is equal to 
 EC .
7
4 For the sake of simplicity, we assume that national knowledge spillovers are already accounted for in the domestic 
knowledge production function, K
S. The LDC sending country is denoted with superscript S and the EU receiving country 
with superscript R.
5 We recognise that in reality there are many more decisions to make, e.g. labour-leisure, consumption, etc. 
6 We implicitly assume that all workers, for whom it pays off to become skilled, invest in education. 
7 For the sake of graphical tractability, we assume that the elasticity of unskilled labour demand is infinitely elastic. If the
elasticity of unskilled labour demand would be partially elastic, then there would be additional unskilled labour wage effect, 
which would affect the ratio of skilled/unskilled workers in S. However, the obtained results with partially elastic unskilled 
labour demand would be qualitatively similar to those presented above.  The equilibrium for receiving country, R, is analogous. In absence of migration, the equilibrium 




U w , and 
 R
H L , respectively 
(Figure 1, right panel). 
Second, we consider the skilled worker decision where to offer their work, at home or abroad, which 
determines the short-run equilibrium migration. According to Sjaastad (1962), the trade-off, which 
workers face here, is given by the expected income increase through migration versus migration costs, 
MC, (equation 6).
8 Workers migrate if the expected benefits arising from migration are higher than the 
migration costs.
9
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where
m
H L  is skilled labour migration, 
R
H w  is skilled wage rate in R, and MC  are migration costs. 
Due to cross-country differences in knowledge capital, 
S R K K  , the receiving country, R, is more 
developed than sending country, S . Differences in country development and hence wage levels 
trigger migration from S  to R. In the presence of positive migration costs,  0  MC , the net wage, 
which migrant workers earn, is lower than the skilled incumbent wage in R, because the net wage of 
migrants is equal to skilled wage in destination country, 
R
H w , minus migration costs, MC .
According to migration network theory and the empirical evidence (Carrington, Detriagiache and 
Vishwanath 1996), migration costs are not constant, they decrease in the number of migrants from S
residing in R. In Figure 1 (middle panel) these network effects are captured by a decreasing vertical 
distance between curves 
m
MC S  and 
m S . Curve 
m S  is migrant work supply on the international labour 
market, which is derived by subtracting skilled labour supply, 
S
H S , from skilled labour demand, 
S
H D ,
in S . Curve 
m
MC S  is migrant supply adjusted by migration costs MC .
In equilibrium 
m
H L  skilled workers migrate incurring migration cost, 
 MC , and receiving net wage, 

 




H . The equilibrium wage rate of skilled labour, 
 R
Ho w , is determined by the 
intersection of migration supply, 
m
MC S , and migration demand 
m D  (Figure 1, middle panel). Migration 
demand, 
m D , is derived by subtracting skilled labour demand, 
R
H D , from supply, 
R
H S , in R. (right 
panel in Figure 1). Immigration reduces skilled wage in R from 
 R
H w  (skilled equilibrium wage 
without migration) to 
 R
Ho w  (skilled equilibrium wage with migration). The magnitude of the wage 
effect depends on the sending country S 's relative size - the larger is S  relative to R, the bigger is 
the wage effect in R. If S  is sufficiently small, then migration does not affect the equilibrium wage 
rate in R at all. This would be the case if S  faces perfectly elastic skilled labour demand in R, such 
as
R
H D 1 (Figure 1, right panel). In this case, the equilibrium skilled labour wage in R would be equal 
8 These costs include not only the direct transportation costs to the destination country, but also employment uncertainty 
(which is higher abroad than at home), social costs of leaving family and/or friends behind, cultural adjustment costs, 
language barriers, etc. (Straubhaar 1986). 
9 We recognise that in reality the migration decision of workers is driven not only by wage differences but also by non-
economic considerations. However, in the present study we abstract from all other determinants of migration and consider 
cross-country wages differences as the only force driving labour migration. to
 R
Ho w  both with and without migration and migration would be equal to 
m
H L .
Workers from S  migrate to R as long as 









H L L  , is determined by the slope of migrant work supply curve, 
m
MC S . Due to 
emigration, the stock of skilled and unskilled labour in S  decreases from 
 S
H L  to 
Sn




S L L  to 
Sm
H
S L L  , respectively. Given that the stock of skilled workers decreases relatively more 
than that of unskilled, the return to education increases. As a result, the equilibrium mass of workers 
who acquire education increases from 
 S
H L  to
Sm




H L L 
 .
In Figure 1 we have assumed that only skilled workers have a migration option. Abstracting from the 
unskilled worker migration is motivated by two considerations: the focus of the study and the 









U L /  holds, the results with unskilled labour migration would be qualitatively equal to 
those presented here. 
2.4. Knowledge capital 
According to equation (4), the level of knowledge available in S  is determined by domestic 
knowledge production and foreign knowledge spillovers. Knowledge creation involves production of 
new knowledge, whereas knowledge adoption is uptake of knowledge developed in other countries 
(both are costly). In order to increase the level of knowledge, sending country, S , can invest in 
knowledge production (new knowledge) or in knowledge adoption of inward spillovers (adopted 
knowledge). 
In equation (7) the level of technology (knowledge) available in S  is determined by a total (private 
and public) expenditure on knowledge, 
S TR , and skilled workforce, 
S
H L . Knowledge, 
S K , increases 
in both R&D expenditure, 
S TR , and human capital, 
S
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In absence of knowledge flows between countries (autarky), the only source of country S 's
knowledge improvement is innovation through investment in R&D. The autarky equilibrium 
knowledge in S  is shown upper panel of Figure 2, where the horizontal axis measures the level of 
knowledge,
S K , and the vertical axes measures units of expenditure spent on knowledge 
accumulation,  ) / (
S S S K TR tr  . We assume that marginal costs of knowledge creation, 
S
C MC , are 
increasing in technological development, and marginal productivity (benefit) of knowledge demand, 
S MB , is decreasing in technological development (both new and adopted knowledge). This is 
represented by the upward and downward sloping marginal cost and productivity curves, 
S MC , and 
S MB , respectively (upper panel in Figure 2). In absence of international knowledge flows, the 
equilibrium domestic innovation, 
 S
C K , is at the point where marginal costs of knowledge creation, 
10 This follows from equation (2). S
C MC , and  marginal productivity of knowledge, 




 S tr  units of R&D expenditure. 
Analogously, knowledge for receiving country, R, is shown in bottom panel of Figure 2. The 
intersection between receiving country, R's, marginal cost of knowledge creation, 
R
C MC , and 
marginal productivity of knowledge, 
R MB , yields equilibrium domestic innovation and per unit 
expenditure
 R
C K  and 
 R tr , respectively. Assuming higher skilled/unskilled worker ratio in R implies 





C K K ).
Next, consider the opening of borders for international knowledge flows. As shown in Figure 2, in 
open economy equilibrium more knowledge available in R allows S  to adopt inward knowledge 
spillovers from the more developed R. The maximum level of spillover knowledge which can be 
adopted in S  is equal to the R's equilibrium knowledge production, 
 R
C K . On the other hand, in a two 
country model R cannot benefit from knowledge spillovers from S , because the technological 
development in S  is lower than in R.
We assume that S  's marginal costs of knowledge adoption are constant, given along the horizontal 
line
S
A MC , which implies that in absence of knowledge flows between countries, the equilibrium 
expenditure of knowledge creation, 
 S tr , is higher than the marginal costs of knowledge adoption, 
 
S S
A tr MC in equilibrium.
11,12 This assures that in the presence of knowledge flows between 
countries, the knowledge adoption may yield positive profits. The total equilibrium knowledge in S  is 
m
T K , which is a sum of domestically created knowledge, 
m







A K K K   . Hence, in the presence of international knowledge spillovers the equilibrium 










T K K ). Note that knowledge equilibrium in R is not affected by international spillovers, 
because due to country development gap, knowledge spillovers are one-directional: from the more 
developed receiving country, R, to the less developed sending country, S .
2.5. The impact of BC on LDC 
BC affects the innovative capital equilibrium, by reducing migration costs and improving access to 
skilled jobs in EU, which leads to a positive skilled wage gap between EU and LDC.
13 Positive net of 
migration cost wage differences trigger migration of skilled workers from LDC to EU. In addition to 
these direct labour market effects, migration also induces adjustments in the stock and accumulation of 
11 Note that we assume differences in marginal costs between knowledge creation and knowledge adoption. This is consistent 
with the finding in the literature. According to Mansfield (1981), on average imitation costs are about 65 percent of the 
original innovation costs. Further, we assume that both new and adopted knowledge are homogenous in production, i.e. they 
do not differ with respect to marginal productivities. 
12 In reality the marginal costs of knowledge adoption may increase with the additional knowledge adopted. However, the 
slope of the marginal costs of knowledge adoption should be lower than the marginal costs of knowledge creation (Mansfield
1981). To simply the figures we assume constant marginal costs of knowledge adoption, but the results hold in general. 
13 In line with the empirical evidence, we assume that the LDC sending country,  S  , is less developed than the EU receiving 












H w w  . innovative capital (knowledge and human capital) (see Kancs and Ciaian 2010 for a detailed analysis). 





H w , respectively, the equilibrium migration is 
m
H L , and the equilibrium stock and 
wage of unskilled labour is 
Sm
H
S L L  and
 S
U w , respectively, in LDC (Figure 1, left panel). BC reduces 
migration costs. To simplify the graphical exposition we assume that BC reduces migration costs, MC, 
to zero. As a result, the excess supply of skilled labour increases from 
m
MC S  to 
m S  and the equilibrium 
skilled labour wage in LDC increases to 
m
HB w , implying that the wedge between skilled and unskilled 
labour wage in LDC increases.
14 Because of higher skill premium, more workers obtain education 
under BC. The mass of LDC workers who acquire education increases from 
Sm
H L  to 
Sm
HB L . However, 
BC increases skilled labour migration from 
m
H L  to 
m
HB L  (middle panel). In the BC equilibrium LDC 
has less skilled workers 
Sn




HB L L   (left panel). Thus, because of brain drain, BC has a 
strictly negative impact on the human capital in LDC.
15
Second, knowledge productivity in LDC decreases, because after the introduction of BC part of the 
skilled labour from LDC migrates to EU, implying that fewer skilled workers are available in LDC. As 
a result, the absorptive capacity decreases (Cohen and Levinthal 1990). In Figure 6 (upper panel) this 
implies that the marginal productivity curve shifts downward from 
S MB  to 
S
B MB  and the equilibrium 
knowledge decreases from 
m
T K  to 
m
TB K 1. On the other hand, BC increases knowledge productivity in 
EU, because immigration increases skilled labour supply. In Figure 6 (lower panel) higher stock of 
skilled labour increases EU's marginal productivity of knowledge from 
R MB  to 
R
B MB  and the 
equilibrium knowledge increases from 
 R
C K  to 
 R
CB K . More knowledge in EU does not affect the 
knowledge level in LDC, because the LDC's absorptive capacity is constraining absorption of more 











TB K K 1 , respectively. 
Kapur (2001) argues that skilled worker migration facilitates the spillover of knowledge, technology 
and business contacts from destination countries, by interacting as a carrier between knowledge 
producing country and knowledge absorbing country. In migration literature this effect is known as the 
diaspora effect. This in turn suggests that skilled worker migration induced by BC will reduce the 
barriers of EU's knowledge flows to LDC and increase the absorptive capacity. In Figure 6 (upper 
panel) the marginal costs of knowledge adoption decreases from 
S
A MC  to 
S
AB MC  and the equilibrium 
total knowledge shifts from 
m
TB K 1 to 
m
TB K . Thus, through the reduced knowledge transmission barriers, 
BC will increase the productive inward knowledge spillovers. 
14 The exact magnitude of this wage ratio effect depends on the elasticity of unskilled labour demand. In Figure 1 the 
elasticity of unskilled labour demand is assumed to be infinitely elastic implying no unskilled wage effect. 
15 In the case of small LDC country the skilled labour demand in the EU is perfectly elastic 
R
H D 1 (Figure 3). In this case the 
equilibrium skilled labour wage in EU would be equal to 
 R
Ho w , both with BC and without BC. The equilibrium skilled 
labour migration would equal to 
m
H L  without BC and 
m
Ho L  with BC. Compared to migration from a large LDC, more 




Ho L L  , implying less human capital in LDC. Thus, the losses of human capital induced by 
BC are lower if LDC is large compared to a small LDC. 3. Migration policy options for LDC 
Often migration policy studies propose either (i) infeasible policy recommendations, such as to restrict 
emigration (Abella 1992); (ii) rather general policy recommendations, such as to improve the 
economic situation in LDC (Lowell and Findlay 2001); (iii) or both infeasible and general, such as to 
increase investment and trade with developed countries (OECD 2009). Although, efficient from 
migration theory's perspective, they are of little help for policymakers in LDC.
16
Recognising these insufficiencies, in this section we propose and examine specific migration policy 
instruments, while accounting for their political implementation feasibility. In the context of 
international labour migration policies, there are three important policy implementation constraints: (i) 
government budget constraint, (ii) political support constraint, and (iii) country openness, all of which 
we account for.
17
3.1. Migration taxes 
First, in order to compensate for BC-induced losses in innovative capital and to reduce the migration-
driving international net wage differences, LDC government can imposes a migration tax (Bhagwati 
tax) to emigrating skilled workers (Bhagwati 1976). The impact of Bhagwati tax on human capital in 
LDC is shown in Figure 1. We assume that tax, 
m
H t , is imposed on emigrating skilled workers (for the 
sake of simplicity we assume that 
  MC t
m
H ). The migration tax does not affect domestic workers in 





. Because of smaller net wage differences between LDC and EU, the number of migrants 
decreases from 
m
HB L  to 
m




HB L L   and the mass of skilled workers in LDC increases from 
Sn
HB L  to 
Sn




HB L L  .
18 Note that the emigration and the size of skilled labour force are 
reduced to their pre-BC levels, because we assumed that the tax is equal to the migration costs, 
  MC t
m
H .
Second, given that Bhagwati tax requires high international cooperation between LDC and EU, the 
skilled worker incentives for making use of BC can be reduced by increasing the skilled wage in LDC, 
for example, by imposing a differentiated tax rate for skilled and unskilled workers. In order to 
simplify the following analysis we assume that only unskilled labour is taxed with a tax rate equal to 
16According to Lucas (2004), the two main reasons why the suggested migration policies are seldom implemented in praxis: 
(i) either they are too general (e.g. improve the economic situation); (ii) or politically infeasible (e.g. Bhagwati tax), or both.
17First, if there would be no restrictions to government expenditure, then through wage subsidies LDC's government could 
straightforwardly increase the wage rate up to the EU level, and there would be no economically-driven emigration either 
with or without BC. Second, if maintaining political power would not be a government objective, then it could infinitely 
increase the tax rate for unskilled labour, decrease for skilled and achieve similar results. Third, if restricting outward 
migration would be a feasible policy option for LDC, then government could isolate the country from the rest of the world, 
and there would be no international labour migration in autarky. Obviously, all three policy scenarios are unrealistic and 
hence infeasible. 
18If feasible, migration quota/restriction would have a similar effect to Bhagwati tax on human capital in LDC. The only 
difference is that migration quota would not contribute to government budget. U t .
19 A skill-biased tax affects only the demand for unskilled labour, which in Figure 3 shifts from 
S
U D  to 
S
Ut D . The corresponding shift in the skilled labour supply is from 
S
H S  to 
S
Ht S . Skilled labour 
demand remains unaffected at 
S
H D . Taxes reduce the net wage of unskilled labour. The incentives for 
education increases leading to higher migration. Higher migration, in turn, decreases skilled labour 
wage. In equilibrium the wage rate for skilled labour decreases from 
m
HB w  with BC to 
m
Ht w  with skill-
biased tax. Lower wage allows firms in LDC to hire more skilled workers. As a result, the size of 
skilled labour force in LDC increases from 
Sn
HB L  to 
Sn




HB L L   and emigration increases to 
m




Ht L L  .
In the above analysis we implicitly assumed that LDC is large enough to affect the international wage 
rate for skilled labour. Only this indirect wage effect increased skilled labour in LDC. More precisely, 
by introducing a skill-biased tax, LDC dampens the wage for skilled labour in EU, which depresses 
international skilled wage. If, however, LDC is sufficiently small, then LDC's tax policy does not 
affect the international wage rate for skilled labour. This would be the case, for example, if the EU's 
skilled labour demand is perfectly elastic, such as 
R
H D 1 in Figure 3. The skilled wage with BC is 
 R
Ho w ,
both with and without the skill-biased tax, and will not be affected by LDC's tax policy. As a result, in 
both cases with and without taxation of unskilled labour, the stock of skilled labour in small LDC will 
stay unchanged at 
Sn
Ho L . However, in the presence of BC, a skill-biased tax will increase migration 
from 
m
Ho L  to 
m
H L 2, which is due to reduced after-tax wages in LDC. 
3.2. Skill subsidies 
In order to reduce/compensate for BC-induced losses in human capital, LDC government can top up 
skilled wage by a subsidy (Heckman 2000, Carneiro and Heckman 2003). This is shown in Figure 4. 
The initial equilibrium emigration with BC (share of workers which would emigrate without skill 







HB L L L   , the initial stock of skilled labour by 
Sn
HB L , and the initial 
wage rate by 
m
HB w . In order to reduce the cross-country wage gap, which drives migration, LDC grants 
skill subsidy,  H s . First, assume that LDC pays the subsidy directly to skilled workers. 
The effect of direct skill subsidy is shown in Figure 4, where the skill subsidy shifts the supply of 
skilled labour down from 
S
H S  to 
S
HS S . The demand for skilled labour is, however, not affected at 
S
H D .
As a result, the wage rate for skilled labour decreases from 
m
HB w  to 
m
Hs w . The total income of skilled 
labour is equal to wage plus subsidy,  H
m
Hs s w  . The size of skilled work force in LDC increases from 
Sn
HB L  to 
Sn




HB L L  . Note that the stock of skilled labour increases only because of the 
indirect wage effect - the skilled wage decreases from 
m
HB w  to 
m
Hs w . As a result, firms in LDC hire 
more skilled workers. However, if LDC is small enough, the international wage rate for skilled labour 
is not affected. With perfectly elastic skilled labour demand, 
R
H D 1, the wage rate and LDC's skilled 
labour stock stays at 
 R
Ho w  and 
Sn
Ho L , respectively, both with and without skill subsidy. More skilled 
workers have incentives to migrate, because with skill subsidy,  H s , it becomes easier to buy the 
19If both types of labour were taxed, then  U t  would represent the tax difference between skilled and unskilled work. 'migration ticket' - BC, as it is cheaper to acquire education and then migrate. In Figure 4 skilled 
labour migration increases from 
m
HB L  to 
m




HB L L   (in the case of a big LDC) and from 
m
Ho L  to 
m




Ho L L 2   (in the case of a small LDC). 
LDC government can improve the efficiency of skill subsidy by targeting the subsidy toward those 
skilled workers, e.g. through employer, which do not migrate. Assume that the same subsidy is granted 
to companies in LDC to decrease skilled labour costs. The effect of indirect skill subsidy is shown in 
Figure 4, where the subsidy does not affect the supply of skilled labour, 
S
H S , but instead shifts the 
demand for skilled labour up from 
S
H D  to 
S
Hd D . Because of higher demand, the wage rate for skilled 
labour increases from 
m
HB w  to 
m
Hd w . Higher domestic wage implies that less skilled workers have 
incentives to emigrate. As a result, migration decreases from 
m
HB L  to 
m




Hd L L  . In the 
same time, because of higher wage, the stock of skilled labour at home increases from 
Sn







HB L L  .
Comparing the two types of skill subsidies (direct and indirect) suggests that skill subsidy to firms is 













Hs H L s L s  . The indirect skill subsidy is more efficient, because it is better targeted than the 
direct skill subsidy. The main disadvantage of the direct skill subsidy is that it also supports those 
workers that will emigrate. In other words, it helps them to buy the 'migration ticket' - BC.
20 A subsidy 
granted to skilled labour increases the stock of skilled labour only indirectly, through the international 
wage effect for skilled labour. If LDC is sufficiently small, then the skill subsidy has no effect at all on 
the stock of skilled labour in LDC. 
3.3. Education subsidies 
According to the underlying innovative capital framework, worker education decision is determined 
by a trade-off between the wage increase for skilled work (skill premium) and the cost of education. 
Thus, in addition to increasing the skill premium, the demand for education can be also increased by 
reducing the cost of education, for example, by investing in public education, or by subsidising 
education through government scholarships (Heckman 2000, Carneiro and Heckman 2003, Fender
and Wang 2003). 
The effect of direct education subsidy is similar to direct skill subsidy. As above, the stock of skilled 
labour increases only because of indirect wage effect. Higher supply of skilled workers exerts a 
downward pressure on skilled labour wage, which decreases. If skilled wage rate would not change, 
then the stock of skilled labour would stay the same. Therefore, this policy is ineffective in terms of 
increasing human capital. In addition, the direct education subsidy also increases migration. The stock 
of skilled labour in LDC depends only on the skilled wage effect in EU, but not on the education 
policy directly. 
20Note that high-level skills obtained through the education is a precondition for eligibility of the EU Blue Card. The effectiveness of education subsidy can be increased by conditioning the education subsidy on 
post-education employment in the LDC providing education. Conditional education subsidy has been 
implemented in several LDC and has proven to be an efficient way of increasing the stock of human 
capital (Lowell and Findlay 2001). Graphically the effect of conditional education subsidy is shown in 
Figure 4, where the stock of skilled workers increases from 
Sn
HB L  with BC to 
 S
H L  with conditional 
education subsidy. As a result, all skilled workers stay in LDC and there is no migration. 
Alternatively, LDC government can implement the education subsidy through employer (similarly to 
skill subsidy). The support for education at firm level (indirect education subsidy) will shift the 
demand for skilled labour up. Higher demand for skilled labour exerts upward pressure on skilled 
labour wage. Because of higher skill premium, the stock of skilled labour in LDC will increase. 
Hence, the indirect education subsidy is more efficient than policy addressing education through 
labour market supply side (direct education subsidy) for three reasons: (i) the stock of skilled labour is 
higher in LDC, (ii) lower migration, and (iii) lower budgetary costs. Thus, by supporting the education 
at firm level (addressing the demand side of skilled labour market), the policy is better targeted and 
hence more efficient. This policy has a similar effect to indirect skill subsidy. 
If invested in education, the remittances from EU increase equilibrium education in LDC. Hence, by 
increasing incentives for investing remittances into education, e.g. by introducing a tax relief for 
remittances or reducing remittance transfer costs, LDC government could increase education.
21 A tax 
relief for remittances would increase the purchasing power of remittances in LDC and hence the 
incentives to remit. The share of remittances invested in education can be increased, for example, by 
introducing a distorting taxation to remittances spent for consumption goods and/or tax exemptions to 
remittances invested in education.
22 Because the purchasing power of remittances for consumption 
goods would decrease compared to education services, more remittances would be invested in 
education. As a result, the stock of skilled workers would increase in LDC. This can be seen in Figure 
5. Increases a remittance tax rate for consumption goods changes the relative prices of remittances 
spent on consumption and education, which in turn shifts skilled labour supply from 
S
H S  to 
S
Hr S . As a 
result, the stock of skilled labour in LDC increases from 
Sn




As above, the efficiency of education remittance tax relief can be improved by granting the tax relief 
only for those skilled workers that remain in LDC, because part of the additional workers which obtain 
education would emigrate (in Figure 5 skilled labour migration increases from 
m
HB L  to 
m
Hr L ).
21In most LDC remittances are subject to income tax (Chami, Fullenkamp and Jahjah 2003). 
22None of the proposed policies would affect/worsen government revenue: lower remittance taxes would lead to more 
remittance, and hence compensate the lower tax rate. However, lower remittance taxes can be compensated by higher taxes 
on consumption goods. 
23Note that the stock of skilled labour increases only because of the indirect wage effect. In the case of a small LDC country, 
the tax relief for remittances invested in education will not affect the LDC skilled labour. With perfectly elastic skilled labour 
demand
R
H D 1 the wage rate and LDC skilled labour stock stays at 
 R
Ho w  and 
Sn
Ho L , respectively, both with and without the 
tax relief for remittances. 3.4. R&D policies 
As shown in section 3, high skill migration affects not only human capital but also knowledge capital 
in LDC. Hence, in addition to coping with BC-caused losses in human capital, LDC government also 
has to cope with decreasing knowledge capital (which not only reduces growth, but also co-determines 
skilled labour migration). The two main options for increasing knowledge capital are investing in 
R&D for generating new ideas (subsidising the innovation of new knowledge), or in adoption of 
foreign knowledge (subsidising the adoption of foreign knowledge). Figure 6 shows the effects of both 
types of polices. 
Knowledge adoption subsidy can be implemented in two ways: co-financing the cost of knowledge 
adoption or subsidising the demand for knowledge, 
S
B MB . Figure 6 (upper panel) shows the effect of a 
policy, which co-finances the cost of knowledge adoption. We assume that LDC government pays 
knowledge subsidy,  K s , per unit of adopted knowledge. Knowledge adoption subsidy reduces 
marginal costs of knowledge adoption from 
S
AB MC  to 
S
As MC , which increases LDC's equilibrium 
knowledge from 
m
TB K  with BC to 
m
Ts K  with  K s .
Other option at disposal of LDC is to subsidise the creation of new knowledge. Assume that LDC's 
government pays the same subsidy,  K s , to reduce the cost of new knowledge creation. In Figure 6 
(upper panel) this implies that the marginal cost curve of knowledge creation shifts from 
S
C MC  to 
S
Cs MC . In this case knowledge production subsidy, K s , does not affects the equilibrium level of 
knowledge in LDC. Hence, in the presence of BC knowledge capital stays unchanged at 
m
TB K  both 
with and without  K s . The knowledge production subsidy,  K s , only changes the equilibrium 
distribution between new knowledge and adopted knowledge: it increases the innovation of new 
knowledge from 
m
CB K  to 
m








TB K K  .
These results suggest that, as long as the knowledge gap is positive, subsidising the creation of new 
knowledge is less efficient than subsidising the adoption of foreign knowledge. For LDC it is cheaper 
to adopt foreign knowledge than to produce new knowledge. As a result, subsidising the creation of 
new knowledge only offsets the cost disadvantage of new knowledge production compared to 
knowledge adoption and leads to zero (or smaller) increase in the total knowledge capital.
24
On the other hand, the reallocation of subsidies between adopting foreign knowledge and producing 
new knowledge affects also skilled migration, at least in the long run. Investing in R&D increases the 
productivity of both skilled and unskilled labour. However, because the efficiency of subsidies 
invested in new knowledge creation is lower than the efficiency of subsidies invested in knowledge 
adoption, the increase in productivity of labour is higher with latter than with former policy. These 
24 Note that if marginal costs of knowledge adoption, 
S
AB MC , is not constant but increasing in knowledge adoption, then 
subsidising the creation of new knowledge will result in higher knowledge capital in equilibrium. However, because creation 
of knowledge is more expensive than adoption of foreign knowledge (i.e. in terms of Figure 2 the slope of 
S
C MC  is higher 
than the slope of 
S
AB MC ), the result that subsidising the creation of new knowledge is less efficient than subsidising the 
adoption of knowledge holds in general. effects are shown in Figure 7. Investing in production of new knowledge increases skilled labour 
demand from 
S
H D  to 
S
H D 1 and unskilled labour demand from 
S
U D  to 
S
U D 1 (Figure 7, left panel).
25 Due 
to increase in unskilled labour wage, skilled labour supply increases from 
S
H S  to 
S
H S 1. Because of 
smaller wage gap between EU and LDC, the stock of skilled labour in LDC increases from 
Sn
HB L  to 
Sn




HB L L 1  , and migration of skilled workers decreases to 
m




HB L L 1  .
As shown in Figure 6, reallocating subsidies from new knowledge production to foreign knowledge 
adoption, the knowledge capital increases stronger and hence labour productivity in LDC increases 
more. In Figure 7 higher productivity shifts labour demand more upwards: from 
S
H D  to 
S
H D 2 for 
skilled labour and from 
S
U D  to 
S





H S 2. Migration decreases to 
m






HB L L L 2 1   . The stock of skilled labour in LDC 
increases to 
Sn






H L L L   1 2 .
In summary, the efficiency of knowledge the adoption subsidy is higher than of the knowledge 
production subsidy. The latter increases more knowledge capital and hence labour productivity. 
Higher productivity increases skilled labour in LDC and reduces skilled migration more efficiently 
than the knowledge production subsidy. 
3.5. Policy recommendations 
Findings from the previous sections suggest that policies that address the supply side of skilled labour 
market (e.g., direct education subsidy, direct skill subsidy) are the least efficient. This is especially the 
case when the LDC is small relative to EU, as such policies enhance migration, but they do not have a 
direct impact on skilled labour stock in LDC. Only if the LDC is large enough compared to EU, 
supply side policies may increase the stock of skilled labour in LDC, as skilled migration decreases 
the international wage rate for the skilled labour. Only this indirect wage effect will increase the stock 
of skilled labour in LDC. Because of lower wage rate, less skilled workers will have an incentive to 
migrate. If, however, LDC is small, there will be no wage effect and the stock of skilled labour will 
not be affected by direct subsidies at all. The key issue of policies that address the supply side of 
skilled labour market is that these policies do not distinguish between skilled labour that migrates and 
skilled labour that stays. Being targeted at both potential migrants and non-migrants, they help also the 
potential migrants to buy the 'skill migration ticket' - BC. 
The efficiency of migration policies in LDC can be improved through a better targeting: (i) directly on 
the demand side of skilled labour market (e.g. through skill subsidy granted to firms, or subsidising 
education at firm level); or (ii) directly on migrants only (e.g. through Bhagwati tax, conditional 
education subsidy). Whereas the former changes incentives only of those that stay, the latter does the 
reverse - it changes the incentives of those that migrate. In terms of the implementation feasibility, the 
policy that addresses the demand side of skilled labour market appears to be less costly. The 
25Here we assume that subsidies invested in new knowledge creation increase knowledge capital in LDC. This holds when 
marginal costs of knowledge adoption, 
S
AB MC , are increasing in knowledge adoption. enforcement costs of policy, which addresses only migrants, is more costly and may require 
cooperation with the receiving country which may not be desired by the EU. 
Figure 8 classifies LDC policy options according to two criteria. The vertical axes shows the political 
implementation costs, IC , which capture administrative implementation cost and political support, 
which decreases in taxes. The horizontal axes shows policy efficiency in increasing the stock of skilled 
labour,
Sn




The most efficient policies are located in quadrant IV. Indirect education subsidy, indirect skill 
subsidy to firms and investment in knowledge adoption are the most efficient policies in terms of 
political implementation costs and in terms of increasing the distribution of skilled labour between 




H L L / . They have relatively low costs of implementation and lead to a high increase 
in the stock of skilled labour by decreasing brain drain. However, these policies do not have the 
highest political support after migration, i.e. they are not at the bottom of quadrant IV. With skilled 
worker emigration, the political support for redistributive policies increases (Kancs and Ciaian 2010). 
Investment in new knowledge has the same political implementation costs as the other two policies in 




H L L /  ratio than investment in knowledge 
adoption. 




H L L /  ratio 
and are politically infeasible. The policy that targets remittances spent on education is costly in terms 
of implementation, as it requires cooperation with EU, which may be rather limited. In the same time 
it increases migration, because it encourages to acquire education and to emigrate (it will be easer to 
'buy' BC). It increases the stock of skilled labour only indirectly through wage effect if LDC is large. 
If LDC is small, then this policy will not have any impact on the stock of skilled labour in LDC. 
Quadrant III shows policies that are politically feasible but inefficient in maintaining the innovative 
capital. These policies include: direct skill subsidy paid to workers, direct education subsidy, and skill-




H L L /  ratio, as a policy that targets 
remittances to be spent on education. According to Kancs and Ciaian (2010), the direct skill subsidy is 
politically more feasible than the direct education subsidy, and the skill-biased tax, because after 
migration there is less political support for polices that target growth related issues as well, as the 
share of unskilled labour in voting population increases, which will make it difficult to introduce 
higher tax rate for unskilled labour. 




H L L /  ratio but are politically 
infeasible. There are two policies in this quadrant: Bhagwati tax and migration quota/restriction. Both 
the Bhagwati tax and the migration quota/restriction efficiently increase the stock of skilled labour and 
decreases migration. However, their implementation is very costly, because they both require 
cooperation with EU and expensive border control measures. The EU cooperation is questionable 




H L L / .since it would contradict the objectives of BC. 
3.6. Discussion and limitations 
Despite the holistic framework, as all models, our analysis is subject to several limitations, which 
should be kept in mind when interpreting the model results. First, the innovative capital model we 
propose is throughout static. This implies that the potentially reciprocal effects of migration on both 
receiving and sending countries are not considered in the analysis. In order to analyse the causal 
effects of migration on economic growth and knowledge exchange, a dynamic and longitudinal model 
is called for, which is a promising avenue for future research. Second, the proposed model is partial 
equilibrium in sense that the two main effects (human capital and knowledge capital) are analysed 
separately. In reality, however, they are interlinked and affect each other. Hence, in future the 
underlying innovative capital model should be extended by incorporating an interaction term between 
human and knowledge capital. Third, due to data limitations, the present paper is largely theoretical. In 
future the analysis could be considerably strengthened, if empirical evidence could be presented. 
4. Conclusions 
In May 2009 the EU adopted a Blue Card directive, which will facilitate the entry, highly qualified 
employment, and residence of highly skilled LDC workers in EU. The present paper examines the 
potential impacts, which BC may cause on knowledge and human capital in the least developed 
migrant sending countries. 
The conceptual framework we adopt in the present study is based on the theory of innovative capital 
(Furman, Porter and Stern 2002), which combines insights from several theories, which in our view 
are important for LDC growth prospects: investment in education and skill premium stressed by labour 
economics, brain drain, brain waste and brain gain, stressed by different migration theories, R&D and 
innovation role and knowledge capital, and knowledge spillovers literature. 
In line with previous studies (Beine, Docquier and Rapoport 2001; Lowell and Findlay 2001; Lucas
2004; Katseli, Lucas and Xenogiani 2006), we found that BC will reduce human capital in LDC. In 
addition, BC will also have a negative impact on knowledge capital. Although important for LDC 
growth and development, the link between skill migration and knowledge capital has been studied to a 
much lesser extent. In addition, through mutual interaction of the two components of innovative 
capital (knowledge and human capital), the long-run equilibrium will likely be different from a partial 
equilibrium short run perspective. 
Based on the identified impacts on selected growth drivers, we propose and examine alternative policy 
instruments for LDC. Our findings suggest that policies implemented on the demand side of skilled 
labour market (e.g. through skill subsidy granted to firms, or subsidising education at firm level) are 
the most efficient, followed by policies targeted only to migrants (e.g. through Bhagwati tax, 
conditional education subsidy). Policies that address the supply side of skilled labour market (e.g., 
direct education subsidy, direct skill subsidy) are the least efficient, although their implementation feasibility is higher. 
Turning to limitations of our study, we recognise that, although accounting for most important aspects 
of skilled labour migration on innovative capital in LDC, the performed graphical analysis cannot 
provide us with a quantitative assessment of BC impacts on LDC growth prospects. Nevertheless, by 
pointing to the adverse growth issues arising from BC in LDC, our study offers a blueprint for 
deriving a formal general equilibrium framework with endogenous growth and location engines by 
linking innovative capital to technological development and economic growth in LDC for assessing 
the impact of BC. This is a promising area for future research. 
Summarising our findings we conclude that without appropriate policy responses, the adopted EU 
Blue Card makes developing country growth prospects rather bleak than blue. 
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SFigure 8. Policy classification 
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